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Abstract 
This research is done for the purpose of finding out the effect of Good 
Governance practice can reduce earnings management practice done 
by company. This research uses companies registered in manufacture 
sector in Indonesia Stock Exchange observation period 2005-2007 as 
samples. Last sample used in this research is 384 years of observation. 
This research uses OLS method. The result shows that only two 
variables have significant effect to Earning Management practice 
which is CEO Duality and controlling shareholder existence. Other 
independent variables such as independent commissioner and audit 
committee and also shareholder coalition outside the controlling 
shareholder don’t have any effect to earning management practice in 
the company. Control variable like coverage analyst and debt don’t 
have any effect either, to earning management practice existence.  
Keywords: Good Corporate Governance, Earnings Management, 
Coverage Analyst, Debt 
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1. Research Background 
This research focused on earning management, because there are many 
arguments that says whether it can be considered as a rightful action, or a 
manipulation on the real business activity. According to Healy and Wahlen 
(1999) earning management occurred when a manager used his/her consideration 
in his/her financial report which can cause mislead to company’s stakeholder 
about the basic condition of the company. Some studies show the possibility of 
managements intervention in the process of financial report making, not only 
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through estimation and accounting methods used for the report, but also on 
operational decision. Healy and Wahlen (1999), Fudenberg and Tirole (1995), 
and also Dechow and Skinner (2000) shows some earning management that can 
be done by the managers, as faster selling, change product shipping schedule, 
slowing research and development’s expenses and also maintenance’s expenses. 
While Lo (2007) groups earning management in two categories, real earning 
management as an action that affects cashflow, and accrual management through 
changes in accounting estimation and policies. The effect from both of earning 
management caused different cost, real earning management add more cost to 
company (Roychowdhury, 2006). But, a survey done by Graham et al. (2005) 
shows that managers tend to use real earning management rather than accrual 
management. 80% reduce discretionary expense, 55% slows down projects, 
compared to 28% do backup reduction and only 8% changes the assumption and 
accounting policies used. This survey is a contradiction, as real earning 
management needs more money from the management, but this option is 
preferred by them. Research done by Bruns and Merchant (1990) and Graham et 
al. (2005) indicates that management done real earning management more often 
than accrual management with the consideration that accrual manipulation 
causes higher risk. Other researcher, Jiraporn et al. (2006) groups earning 
management to two groups, beneficial earning management and opportunistic 
earning management. Earning management is considered useful if it can use its 
policy to communicate private information it has about company’s prospect, 
which can’t be seen on the company’s financial report history (Arya, Glover, & 
Sunder, 2003; Demski, 1998; Subramanyam, 1996; Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). 
While earning management is considered opportunistic if manager used his/her 
policy to maximize his/her benefit by manipulating the facts of his/her revenue 
(Healy & Palepu, 1993). 
Based on a short explanation above, the next question is what makes the 
managers do earning management? Healy and Wahlen (1999) states that the 
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main motive of the earning management is to create mislead for the information 
user and to affect the contracts made by company. The one that affected by the 
earning management is of course the financial report user. This research then 
explore if there are any earning management practices in the companies listed on 
Indonesian Stock Exchange and how the Good Corporate Governance (GCG) 
effects on the earning management practice which can cause bad effect for 
people. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Healy and Wahlen (1999), in their article states that earning management 
is often done by the management to increase compensation and job security. 
Beside it, earning management is also done to avoid rules breaking in a loan 
contract, reduce regulatory cost, or increase regulatory benefit (Cornett et al., 
2008). Earning management is not only done by the management for their 
benefit, but also for major shareholder, even though it will cause loss for the 
minor shareholder. This fit the statement of Laporta et al (1999, 2000) that 
present an argument that the real problem of most big company listed on 
Indonesia Stock Exchange’s agency conflict is to limit the resources usage by the 
major shareholders (who are the controller shareholder) that can cause loss for 
the minor shareholder. Johnson et al. (2000) calls it “tunneling” as a mean of 
resources transfer from the company to major shareholder’s benefit. Cheung et 
al. (2005) done a study about tunneling activities in China that shows there are 
transaction done between the companies listed in the Stock Exchange with the 
major shareholder. The research shows that the transaction done by them can 
cause bad effects to minor shareholders. Jiang et al. (2005) then documented 
practices done by most of China’s company, where major shareholders used 
company’s loan for their own benefit. Tunneling activities happen often in a 
developing country, country that hasn’t applies GCG. If a company really did 
tunneling, major shareholders will hide the real condition of the company and 
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use the information for their own benefit. One of the ways to cover the real 
condition of company is doing earning management. To reduce earning 
management activities, GCG need to be applied (Klein, 2002; Warfield, Wild, 
and Wild, 1995; Dechow, Sloan, Sweeney, 1996; Beasley, 1996). 
 
Good Corporate Governance 
Corporate Governance is a mechanism developed to increase company 
performance and management’s behavior. Some of GCG mechanisms include 
the existence of independent commissioner, audit committee, no CEO duality, no 
Top Share (controlling shareholder), and shareholder’s coalition in order to face 
controlling shareholder. GCG mechanisms will be explained shortly below. 
1. Independent Commissioner existence 
Klein (2002) found out that board of director from independent side can be 
more effective in supervising action. Cornett et al. (2008) also stated that 
operation performance and stock return is getting better as independent 
commissioner increase. Chen et al. (2006) also found out that characteristic 
of the board is similar to independency, number of meetings and period of 
executive board charges is related to the fraud level in a company. While 
then, Liu and Lu (2007) states that a board structure is not only act as a 
controlling mechanism in the process of making financial report, but also 
prevent controlling shareholder to do activities that can cause loss to the 
other shareholder. In Indonesia (Siregar and Utama, 2008), system that exists 
in Indonesian’s company uses two tier system that consist of commissary 
board and direction board. The function of commissary board is to watch 
over the actions of direction board. To prevent loss of minor shareholder, 
BAPEPAM insist that 30% of commissary board must be independent and 
major shareholders. 
2. Audit Committee  
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Klein (2002) also found out that the existence of audit committee will reduce 
the earning management practices. In Indonesia, research done by Parulian 
(2004) in Siregar and Utama (2008) reveal that there are negative relation 
between discretionary accrual with the audit committee. Klein (2002) states 
that company that has an audit company can prevent earning management 
practices done by the management. Jaggi and Leung (2007) research says the 
same thing. Audit committee can reduce earning management practice in a 
company with a concentrated owner. Lin (2006) did a research to test the 
effect of audit committee existence with earning management shows a 
negative effect, means audit committee can reduce earnings management 
practice done by the management. 
3. CEO Duality 
CEO Duality means someone act as a CEO while at the same time, he/she is 
also the chairman of board. CEO Duality existence will give chances to 
power concentration which can lead to management discretion. Split CEO 
will do more effective monitoring (Cornett et al., 2008). This will be 
different if CEO Duality exists, which can make monitoring action less 
effective and could lead to high level of discretionary accrual. In Indonesia, 
this job may not be doubled by direction board and commissary board in the 
same time, but through nepotism. A lot of Indonesians companies are a 
family company that grows bigger and then turns into a public company. 
This is also the cause of the case where parents act as commissary board and 
his/her children are in direction board, which can lead to management 
discretion. 
4. Top Share 
Liu and Zu (2007) did a research on GCG effects to earning management, 
and one of the GCG’s level appraise is presented by Top Share, major 
shareholders that become controlling shareholders. The existence of major 
shareholder that becomes controlling shareholder will cause expropriate to 
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minor shareholder. Some of the Corporate Governance Report shows that the 
bigger dispersion of a company’s ownership will make GCG applied better 
in the company. Claessen et al. (2000) and Fan and Wong (2001) proves that 
a concentrated ownership especially a single owner will cause GCG 
application in the company worse, and will lead to more earning 
management practice. 
5. Shareholder Coalition 
Controlling shareholder existence will drive cheating done by the 
management and cause loss to other shareholder. But then, the other 
shareholders can form a coalition to fight against the controlling shareholder. 
Liu and Zu (2007) used the similar approach as done by Zingales (1995), use 
shareholder coalition variable instead of controlling shareholder by grouping 
nine of ten biggest shareholders, known as Share:2_10, and this variable is a 
modification of Herfindahl index used to appraise ownership concentration 
level in a company. 
 
Earning Management 
Ortega and Grant (2003) stated that earning management is possible 
because there is flexibility in a financial report making in order to change the 
operational profit of a company. In other words, Abdelghany (2005) explains 
that earnings management is revenue manipulation done to fulfill the target 
stated by the management. Lo (2008) then relates earnings management and 
earnings quality, where a company that did earnings management the most has a 
bad earning quality. But a company that didn’t do earning management doesn’t 
always have good earning quality, because earning quality is affected by many 
factors. This opinion is supported by Schipper and Vincent (2003) whom states 
that earning management will affect earning quality. Earnings management often 
done by companies are (Abdelghany, 2005): 
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1. Big Bath, means cost is admitted using one time restructuring charge. This 
option will cause the company to suffer big expense on cost for this year but 
it will earn big profit on the next year. 
2. Abuse of Materiality, means by manipulating earnings through materiality 
principal, where there is no specific range about how material a transaction 
is. 
3. Cookie Jar, also known as rainy jar or contingency reserves, means in a good 
financial condition period, the company can reduce earnings by making more 
reserves, bigger cost and one write off, vice versa. 
4. Round Tripping, back to back and Swap, done by selling an asset/unit to 
other company with an agreement to buy it back on a fixed price level, and 
this will help increasing company’s revenue. 
5. Voluntary accounting changes, done by changing accounting policy used by 
the company. 
6. Conservative Accounting, done by choosing the most conservative 
accounting method, such as LIFO and adding cost to R&D rather than 
capitalize it. 
7. Using the Derivative, manager can manipulate earnings through hedging 
instrument procurement. 
The most often used method to appraise the level of earning management 
done by a company is discretionary accrual method. Earnings have two main 
component, cash and accounting adjustment known as accrual. The direction and 
measurement of accrual can be easily manipulated as it is heavily influenced by 
the management. The total accrual is split to two components, discretionary 
accrual and non-discretionary accrual. This research will use discretionary 
accrual modified by Jones (1991) and Dechow, Sloan dan Sweeney (1995). The 
amount of positive discretionary accrual shows that company indicates 
increasing income manipulation. In the other hand, negative amount of 
discretionary accrual indicates decreasing income manipulation. But, the usage 
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of discretionary accrual has some weakness (Yu, 2008), and they are: (1) for a 
company doing merger and acquisition, discontinue in operation and the 
company that has significant activities abroad will cause accrual usage become 
inaccurate if it uses balance sheet approach, and (2) discretionary accrual will 
over estimate a company with an extreme performance, rapid growth and volatile 
cash flow. 
Earnings management can be useful for shareholders if earnings 
management is used to inform stuffs not included in the company’s financial 
report. Some researches support this statement and called it beneficial earnings 
management (Subramanyam, 1996). The research done these days, like one done 
by Arya et al. (2003) shows that organization decentralization often happened, 
lead to bigger spread of information causing each person has different piece and 
none has complete information. In this condition, company using earnings 
management can give more complete information compared to company that 
doesn’t use earnings management. Other research done by Louis (2003) states 
that company will do stock splits if manager is optimistic on the performance of 
the company, while manager can use earnings management to show private 
information to make positive impact on the shareholders. But on the other side, 
earnings management can also be done by the management to give negative 
effect on the shareholders by manipulating performance in order to get a job 
contract and compensation. This might caused agency conflict type I between 
management and shareholders (Holthausen et al., 1995; DeAngelo, 1988, 
Dechow dan Sloan, 1991). Controlling shareholder existence condition makes 
earnings management doable by major shareholders, causes negative effect for 
public/minor shareholders and lead to agency conflict type II between major and 
minor shareholders. Usage of earnings management can give benefit for one side 
by causing loss to another person, known as opportunistic earnings management 
(Jiraporn et al., 2006). 
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3. Hypothetical Development 
Earnings management practice is possible in Indonesia, considering 
company ownership in Indonesia tend to be owned by a family and it acts as 
controlling shareholder. The controlling shareholder can use their influence to 
management to do earnings management, which then leads to agency conflict 
type II. If controlling shareholder doesn’t exist in the company, earnings 
management can be done by management, causing loss to shareholders, which 
then leads to agency conflict type I. One of the ways to reduce earnings 
management practice is by applying GCG (Klein, 2002; Warfield, Wild, and 
Wild, 1995; Dechow, Sloan, Sweeney, 1996; Beasley, 1996). From the 
explanation, major hypothesis are made, and they are: 
H1: Application of Good Corporate Governance can reduce earnings 
management practice. 
 
Parts of GCG will be explained below as it will form the minor hypothesis: 
 Independent Commissioner Presences hopefully will be more effective in 
supervising the management, hoping it will reduce the chance earnings 
management practice. But the Independent Commissioner should not chosen 
only to fulfill the rules in Indonesia, because if only to obey the rules, will make 
the presence of Independent Commissioner become useless. And for that, a 
minor hypothesis is made: 
H1a: Independent Commissioner has negative relation with earnings management 
practice. 
  
A company with an audit committee will slow down earnings management 
behavior done by the management. Audit committee presence is expected to 
found practices that go against free information earlier, so it can reduce earnings 
management practice. For that, a minor hypothesis is made: 
H1b: Audit Committee has negative relation to earnings management practice. 
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CEO Duality existence makes it possible for power concentration which can lead 
to management discretion. Split CEO will drive better monitoring action 
(Cornett et al., 2008). This is different if there is any job duality, making 
monitoring action less effective and closely related to higher level of 
discretionary accrual. 
H1c: CEO Duality existence has positive relation to earnings management 
practice. 
   
Presence of Top Share, the major shareholders that become controlling 
shareholder will lead to expropriate to minor shareholders. Some researches have 
proved that concentrated ownership on a single owner will make GCG 
application in the company worse, leading to increased earnings management 
practice.  
H1d: Top Share presence has positive relation to earnings management practice. 
  
Presence of controlling shareholder will drive the major shareholders to cheat 
and cause loss to other shareholders. But the other shareholders can form a 
coalition against the controlling shareholder by making a group/shareholders 
coalition.  
H1e: Shareholder coalition outside the controlling shareholder has negative 
relation to earnings management practice. 
 
 This research also use control variable in the form of coverage analyst (Yu, 
2008) measured by company measurement proxy (Premuruso dan Bhattacharya, 
2008) and company’s presence in LQ-45 index, and also debt usage by the 
company (Premuruso dan Bhattacharya, 2008). 
 Analyst plays an important role to reveal information for a company. Dyck, 
morse dan Zingales (2006) shows that the most efficient way for the external to 
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know the real condition of the company is by the analyst. While then, Graham, 
Harvey dan Rajgopal (2005) done survey to 401 financial executive, result on 
90% analyst state the most important group who can influence share price is 
analyst coverage whom is the second after institution ownership. Healy dan 
Palepu (2001) also states that information intermediaries such as analyst and 
ranking company can drive private information to the open and make it possible 
to detect management’s behavior. In this research, analyst coverage is 
represented by the size of company and companies listed on LQ-45 index. A 
bigger size company has more information than smaller company because big 
company tend to be mass media and analyst’s main concern, so the bigger a 
company, earnings management is expected lower (Premuruso dan Bhattacharya, 
2008). While then, Camferrman dan Cooke (2002) found a significant 
relationship between the size and information shared. A bigger company tends to 
share more information. This research also include companies listed on LQ-45 
index as a proxy of the analyst coverage with the consideration that companies 
listed on LQ-45 index are the most active companies in the stock exchange 
market, makes more analyst discuss about them rather than companies outside 
LQ-45 list. This research also include debt usage of the company variable, where 
a company with high debt will result on higher supervising by the creditor 
(Premuruso dan Bhattacharya, 2008; Jaggi dan Leung, 2007; Yu, 2008 dan 
Bartov et al., 2001). 
 
4. Data and Method 
This research uses all manufacture companies listed in Indonesia Stock 
Exchange 2005-2007 period as sample with the criteria: (1) Company’s data can 
be accessed completely; (2) List of companies in LQ-45 index during 
observation is complete, and (3) never had negative equity during observation. 
Based on these criteria, the number of company that will be take for the sample 
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is 128 companies per year. This research using three years observation, so the 
final number of sample is 384 years of observations. 
  Earnings management (EM) in this research is done by total accrual (ACC) 
and discretionary accrual (DACC). Total accrual is defined as the difference of 
net income and cash flow from operational activities, divided by total assets. 
Total accrual consists of discretionary accrual and non-discretionary accrual. 
Discretionary accrual in this research uses Jones (1991) modification to 
decompose firm level (Total accrual) and uses residual as proxy to discretionary 
accrual. This can be seen from the formula below: 
it
it
it
it
it
it
itit eTA
PPE
TA
v
TA
TAAcc ++Δ+= .Re.1./ 321 ααα  ………………….(1) 
 As: 
 Accit is Total accrual of i company on t period 
 TAit is Total assets of i company on t period 
 ΔRevit is the difference of i company’s sales on t period 
 PPEit is gross property, plant and equipment of i company on t period 
  
Then it uses OLS to estimate the value of formula (1), value of dependent 
variable in Jones’ model is normal accrual and the residue is discretionary 
accrual. 
 
Corporate Governance in this research is measured by these variables below: 
1. Independent Board (IB) in this research uses percentage of independent 
commissioner compared to the total amount of commissioner.  
2. Audit Committee presence (AC) uses dummy. 1 means audit committee 
exists and 0 means audit committee doesn’t exist. 
3. CEO Duality (Dual) in this research uses dummy data. 1 means CEO Duality 
exists and 0 means CEO Duality doesn’t exist. 
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4. Top Share (TS) shows if controlling shareholder are 51% or more using 
dummy. 1 if controlling shareholder exists and 0 if controlling shareholder 
doesn’t exist. 
5. Share2_5 (S2_5) is defined as five biggest shareholders outside the 
controlling shareholder. These five shareholders can form a coalition against 
controlling shareholder. Share2_5’s expectation can be measured with the 
formula: 
∑
=
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=
5
2
2
5_2
n
n
S
SShare   ………………(2) 
 
Controlling Variable in this research uses natural Logarithm of asset 
(ln_asset) to represent size of company, dummy variable of LQ-45 with criteria 1 
for company listed in LQ-45 list and 0 for company not listed in LQ-45 list, and 
also leverage ratio measured as a percentage debt to total company’s equity. 
 To test if earnings management practice really exist, t test is done 
with the criteria ACC = 0 or DACC = 0 if earnings management doesn’t exist. 
This research will use Generalized Methods of Moments to find out the effect of 
GCG and control variable to earnings management practice. The research model 
is developed into a formula (3) below: 
  EMi,t = α1 + β1.IB + β2.KA + β3.DUAL + β4.TS  
    + β5.S2_5 + β6.ln_asset + β7.LQ_45 + β8.LR ……………(3) 
 
5. Result and Discussion 
Based on sample’s criteria, 384 years of observation obtained as the last sample. To 
find out if there is any earning management practices occurred, the data is processed 
to earn the result: 
Table 1. 
T-test Result 
Variable N Means t 
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Accrual 384 -1,6953 -3,304* 
   * Signifikan pada α = 1%  
 
 From table 1 of data processed, it can be seen that significant t value at α = 
1%, which means that at the research period, an earning management practice has 
occurred with negative mean. This indicates there is a tendency that company 
records their income smaller than the real cash flow. 
 Table 2 shows statistic regression after classic assumption test has been done 
and passed. 
 
 
 
Table 2 
OLS Results 
Variable Without Control Variable  With Control Variabl e 
Constant -0,606 -0,292 -2,574 -0,289 
IB 0,037 1,336 0,038 1,385 
KA 1,851 1,579 1,822 1,543 
Dual 2,291 2,217* 2,361 2,263* 
TS -2,021 -1,623** -2,102 -1,656** 
S2_5 -0,017 -0,470 -0,018 -0,504 
Ln_asset 0,101 0,237 
LQ_45 0,284 0,138 
LR 
 
0,000 -0,553 
R-Squared 0,036 0,038 
F 0,016* ,072* 
N 384 384 
Note: * Significant at α = 5% 
        ** Significant at α = 10% 
  
Table 2 has 2 results, the first one is without control variable, and the second one is 
with control variable. Test without control variable will reflect the GCG effect to 
Earning Management practice. From table 2, F test shows significant result at α = 
5% which means GCG appliance can reduce EM practice. Determinant coefficient 
shows 3,6% to EM practice which means GCG appliance can only explain 3,6% to 
EM practice. This small value indicates that there many other factors that causes 
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company do EM practice, and one of them is the possibility to reduce earning tax 
paid, as shown in table 1 that states EM practice with negative means. Partially, t test 
shows that from 5 factor of GCG indicator, only 2 are significant to EM practice, 
they are CEO Duality (dual) and the existence of controlling shareholder (TS). From 
the process result shown in table 2, the higher duality of CEO and owner rate that 
means the owner also roles as the CEO, the higher EM practice rate in the company. 
This is stated at 1c hypothesis. From table 2, it’s also known that the higher 
controlling shareholder existence rate, the lower EM practice rate. This is 
contradictive with the hypothesis stated in 1d. The impossible explanation from the 
result is most of controlling shareholder in Indonesia is institution (69,60%) 
(Murhadi, 2008). This will affect the higher rate of institution ownership that can 
manage the company professionally to reduce EM practice. The research also found 
out that the existence of independent commissioner, audit committee and 
shareholder coalition outside the controlling shareholder don’t have significant 
effect to EM practice. The explanation about no effect from the independent 
commissioner and audit committee is both of them is appointed by the management, 
that makes if they don’t agree with the management’s decision, the company can 
remove them from their position. While the shareholder coalition outside the 
controlling shareholder doesn’t have the power to join forces and affect EM practice 
in the company. 
 From table 2, it’s found out that the data processed using additional control 
variable such as coverage analyst seen from the size of the company and whether the 
company is listed in LQ-45 index or not, and debt using of the company don’t have 
any significant effect to EM practice in the company. But the GCG variable is 
consistent whether control variable is used or not. Usage of control variable can only 
increase determinant coefficient from 3,6% to 3,8%. 
 The research done with control variable or without control variable show 
consistent result. One of the result shows that there are no significant effect from the 
presence of independent commissioner and audit committee is quite ironic. It must 
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be remembered that the presence of independent commissioner and audit committee 
is to protect the interest of minor shareholders and other stakeholder. The 
insignificant role of independent commissioner can be explained, that the position of 
independent commissioner is relatively small in percentage making it not effective 
to affect decisions made by commissioner board. It gets worse with the condition of 
Indonesian culture whom felt ashamed to criticize other people. This explanation 
also works to audit committee who doesn’t give any significant effect to the 
existence of EM practice. 
 Variable control usage as coverage analyst is expected with a big company 
and listed in LQ-45 index, that makes the company is observed by public and stock 
market analyst that can lead to less EM practice done by the company. But the result 
of this research shows that coverage analyst cannot reduce EM practice in the 
company. While then, the other control variable, such as debt usage also doesn’t 
give any significant effect. Higher rate of debt usage should have made creditor run 
a control function toward the company. This can be explained, that the credit given 
to the company by the creditor mainly in obligation form, is not followed by 
controlling function from obligation holder toward the company, and this means 
debt usage cannot reduce EM practice in the company. 
  
6. Conclusion 
From the result, it’s found that GCG practice has a significant effect to EM practice 
done by the company. But from the five GCG indicators, which are audit committee, 
independent commissioner, CEO Duality, Top share, and shareholders coalition, 
only CEO Duality and Top Share have significant effect. Dualisms between the 
owners who also become the CEO boost the EM practice occurrence. While then, 
controlling shareholders presence as an institution made controlling activities more 
professional and result to less EM practice. This research also finds out that 
coverage analyst and debt usage don’t have any effect to reduce EM practice done 
by the company. Analyst presence and debt usage cannot reduce EM practice done 
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by the company. The result also finds out that a lot of Indonesian companies do EM 
with negative leans. This means company is trying to make their revenue look 
smaller because they are trying to avoid tax. 
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